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A. Kantian equilibrium in games I begin by reminding the reader of the definition of Kantian equilibrium in a game (Roemer [2009 (Roemer [ , 2015 ). Consider a game with n agents, each of whom plays a strategy chosen from an interval of real numbers. Denote the payoff function of player i by .
Definition 2.1 An additive Kantian equilibrium of the game is a strategy profile such that no player would like to add any scalar to all strategies; that is:
Mathematically, additive Kantian equilibrium has a similar structure to Nash equilibrium. The difference is in the counterfactuals the agents contemplate when considering a deviation from a given strategy profile. In Nash equilibrium each agent imagines changing her strategy while all other agents stand pat. In Kantian equilibrium, each agent imagines changing all strategies in a symmetric manner. In Nash optimization, I begin by defining an economic environment. There are two produced private goods and a homogeneous kind of labor, measured in efficiency units. There are two firms, each of which produces one of the goods from inputs of labor and capital, using production functions G and H respectively, which map . Worker i is endowed with units of labor in efficiency units, and receives a profit share from Firm l , for
. The state owns fractions of firm , and is endowed with units of the capital good. Good 1 is used both for consumption and capital, and Good 2 is a pure consumption good. The state uses its capital to finance investment in the two firms, and the private agents spend their incomes on consumption of the two goods. Private agent i has preferences over the two consumption goods and labor expended (in efficiency units)
represented by a utility function . All activity takes place in a single period.
For purposes of expositional simplicity, I have specified an environment with two produced commodities and two firms. All the results below generalize to any number of firms producing any number of commodities, in the obvious manner.
Firms are traditional -they are price-takers and demand capital and labor and supply commodities to maximize profits. A flat tax at an exogenous rate will be levied on all private incomes, with the tax revenues returned to the population as a demogrant. Given their incomes (which consist of after-tax wages, capital income and the demogrant) and their labor supply, producer-consumers choose the optimal commodity bundle in the classical way. However, the determination of labor supply, and hence of income, is non-traditional -that is to say, the worker does not choose her labor supply in the Nash manner. A vector of labor supplies must be an additive Kantian equilibrium of a game to be defined below.
(ii) The game The income of the state is:
That is, the state receives its share of firms' profits plus the return on its investment, but this is not taxed, which explains the specification of the demogrant in equation (2.2).
Now suppose that every (private) agent were to increase her total labor by a constant , positive or negative. Then i's hypothetical income would be:
where fraction of the total increase in labor is allocated to Firm 1, and fraction to Firm 2. We need not adopt a rule for how each agent would allocate her additional labor between the two firms, as this will turn out not to matter. It is assumed that workers are price takers: in particular, they take the wage w as given.
A comment on the logic behind equation (2.5) is in order. A Nash player, who chooses his labor supply while assuming all other labor supplies remain fixed, need not consider the effect of his labor-supply decision on either the profits of firms in which he works or owns equity, or upon the demogrant, if the economy is large. Hence, our practice in Nash-type analysis is to ignore these effects. But in Kantian optimization, the counterfactual the worker envisages is that all workers change their labor supplies in the same amount as the change he is contemplating, and hence consistency in the thought experiment requires that we alter the labor supplies to firms, and the value of the demogrant, accordingly. Hence, the formulation of equation (2.5).
At this counterfactual labor supply by worker i, , given her income as specified by (2.5) , let the agent compute her commodity demands, which are the solution of the program: We now define the payoff functions of a game. The payoff to agent i is his utility at prices if the capital invested in the firms is , and the vector of labor supplies were to determine wage income, profit income, and the value of the demogrant, that is:
Incorporated in the payoff function is the assumption that at her personal part of the community effort vector, agent i has chosen her commodity demands optimally, given the income generated.
Thus, given a vector of prices , and the ownership shares of firms, a game whose strategies are effort/labor supplies is defined, denoted . We can define its additive Kantian equilibrium, which is a vector of labor supplies satisfying (2.1): that is to say, a vector such that:
C. Walras-Kant equilibrium with taxation
The data of the economy are .
is the state's endowment of the capital good, which will finance the firm's investment. It is useful, for conceptualizing Pareto efficiency, to define the 'utility function of the state,' which is:
That is, the state cares only about Good 1, which it uses in its role as the capital good. viii. a supply of capital by the state to the two firms that maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint at given firm demands of labor, and ix. all markets clear; that is, ,
, and .
The depreciation rate of capital is set at zero. Thus, at the beginning of the next period the state's endowment of the capital good will be (see eqn. (2.4)). Indeed condition (viii) of the definition of equilibrium is superfluous, and is included only for completeness. For at equilibrium, the firms have maximized joint profits, at the given price vector, which maximizes the state's income, subject to condition that .
The first welfare theorem for market socialism
The appropriate concept of Pareto efficiency will be called investment constrained where , which is a negative number.
Finally, divide both sides of equation (3.14) by the positive number , simplify, and calculate that that equation reduces to:
, (3.15) which is one of the two required efficiency conditions for agent i.
7. Now substitute for in the last equation using , yielding:
By equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.2), the theorem is proved. ν
The key move in the proof is to show that, regardless of the tax rate, when a worker thinks of all workers as varying their labor supplies in the amount she is contemplating varying her own, she internalizes the externality generated by her labor-supply choice -a choice that affects firm profits and tax revenues. Her own action causes a negligible change in these magnitudes, but of course the aggregate effect of many small changes is significant. The additive counterfactual in the universal change in labor supplies and affine income taxation combine in such a way as to exactly cancel the deadweight loss of taxation that afflicts Nash optimization in the labor-supply decision. (This is the meaning of equation (3.12) , the key to the proof.) This kind of pairing -associating a specific cooperative optimization protocol with a particular allocation rule, where the two together deliver Pareto efficiency -is a feature of Kantian equilibrium in simpler (nonmarket) environments, as studied in Roemer (in press). What's new here is combining additive Kantian optimization with markets.
A remark on why the incentive problem, causing deadweight losses in the standard model, does not bite here. Consider, for dramatic effect, an income tax rate of one, and suppose every worker is supplying zero labor (as she would in the standard model at this tax rate). But here, by using the Kantian optimization protocol, a worker balances her share of an increase in income that would occur if all workers increased their labor supply from zero to some small positive ρ against her (very small) disutility of labor at zero. The trade-off is usually worth it. Consequently, at the Kantian equilibrium, even at a tax rate of unity, (most) workers will supply a positive amount of labor.
4. If, on the other hand, (3.24) is false for some i, then there is no interior equilibrium.
It is of interest to compute the lower bound on the labor endowment that will guarantee an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t. From (3.24) , this depends upon the tax rate. We compute this lower bound for various tax rates for our example: . is non-empty and convex because it consists of the maximanda of a linear function on a compact set. Now let , but j more slowly than J. We know from above that , and , and . Therefore the righthand side of (4.17) approaches zero, and so , as was to be proved.
We examine one more case on the boundary of the simplex. Suppose the sign pattern of is (0,+,0,+ Perhaps I am here influenced by the observation that workers have a history of cooperation, and investors do not, at least to the same extent.
The psychology of Kantian optimization
The differentia specifica of the model here proposed, within the class of marketsocialist models, is Kantian optimization in the labor-supply decision. I have argued that, because socialism has always been conceived of as a society with enhanced cooperation among its members, this formalization of what cooperation entails should be welcome.
That a more robust form of cooperation has not been included in designs for market socialism heretofore is due, I suggest, to the lack of a formal representation of cooperative behavior.
It will surely be the case that skepticism regarding my proposal will focus upon the realism of supposing that a large population of producers can learn to optimize their because what a worker loses in the tax on her wage, she gets back in the increased demogrant. They should also understand that, if workers optimize according to Kantian protocol, efficiency is separated from distributional considerations. Thirdly, they must trust that others will behave cooperatively as well, and will not take advantage of their own cooperative behavior, by optimizing in the Nash manner. If these three conditions are met, then the method of implementing cooperative behavior is not difficult: each worker should choose his labor supply to equalize his marginal rates of substitution between commodities and labor to his gross wage, rather than his after-tax wage. Rather than thinking "Is the disutility of an extra day's work worth to me the after-tax wage increment?" the worker should ask whether it is worth the gross wage increment. If we believe people are capable of optimizing in the Nash manner, optimizing in the Kantian manner is no more cognitively demanding, if the necessary conditions are met.
